Anne BarratPublished on 25 August 2026
How long can global agriculture depend on a few maritime routes, suppliers, and energy resources that it does not control, to feed the planet? Are these repeated shocks mere accidents, or the new climate in which production must occur? And if the sector wants to break free from this, where should it start? These questions are not theoretical; they demand urgent answers. Since 2020, shocks have followed one another: Covid, Ukraine, the Red Sea, and now Hormuz, and each time, the same vulnerabilities resurface. "The issue is no longer whether there will be a next shock, but when it will occur," summarizes Nicolas Mousset, CEO of Alpha Agriculture Technologies.
The sector has developed on three pillars that were believed to be solid: abundant energy, cheap inputs, and smooth logistics. All three are now wavering simultaneously. Dependence on fossil fuels, long considered a mere cost constraint, is taking on a new dimension: that of strategic vulnerability. The shock is already reflected in prices and margins. It also forces a rethink of responses: producing differently, better preserving and exploiting soil potential, reducing exposure to inputs, securing supplies, and developing viable technologies.
"The issue is no longer whether there will be a next shock, but when it will occur" Nicolas Mousset
Fertilizers reignite inflation
The first alert came from economists. "A shock on fertilizers comparable to that of 2022 would add about 0.5 percentage points of inflation in the euro area, in addition to the direct impact of the oil shock," calculates Nikolay Markov, an economist at Pictet Asset Management. He immediately warns: "this is a working hypothesis, not a prediction." The mere increase in oil prices, he estimates, already adds about 0.8 percentage points of inflation in the euro area and nearly one point in the United States.
The cause: the extreme exposure of nitrogen fertilizers to flows from the Persian Gulf. "About 30% of the world's urea trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz," recalls Arthur Portier, a farmer in northern France and a consultant at Argus Media. Urea, along with ammonia, is the essential raw material for nitrogen fertilizers on which the yield and protein content of most major crops depend.
"A shock on fertilizers comparable to that of 2022 would add about 0.5 percentage points of inflation in the euro area, in addition to the direct impact of the oil shock" Nikolay Markov
Since the beginning of the conflict, data has confirmed this transmission mechanism. Nitrogen has experienced wild fluctuations: the price of urea, around $400 per ton before the conflict, exceeded $850 in April (+80% since February) before falling back to $450 in June, thanks to a brief lull, only to rise again with the renewed tensions in July. For the year as a whole, the World Bank still expects an increase of more than 30% in its fertilizer index. The reasons include the closure of Hormuz, but also a cascade of production stoppages: Iran has suspended its ammonia production, Qatar has halted urea, ammonia, and sulfur production after damage to its facilities, and India has reduced its output due to a lack of LNG. At the height of the price surge in April, the accessibility of fertilizers for farmers fell to its lowest level since mid-2022, the World Bank emphasizes.
The International Monetary Fund has acknowledged the shock. In its update last July, it described "the largest energy supply shock ever recorded," with oil prices rising by about 32% (nearly $89 per barrel expected on average in 2026, compared to $62 before the conflict). It raised its global inflation forecast from 4.1% in 2025 to 4.7% in 2026 and lowered its growth forecast to 3%. The disinflation that began in 2024 has been halted.
The phenomenon extends far beyond Europe. The most exposed are countries that heavily import fertilizers and energy, especially in Africa and Asia: Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Jordan, South Africa, and Namibia are at the forefront of induced food insecurity.
This macroeconomic reading is experienced daily by practitioners, who point out the specificity of this shock. "The war in Ukraine affected both energy and a major global grain hub," recalls Arthur Portier. Agricultural prices were thus rising along with production costs. The Hormuz crisis, however, is primarily energy-related: costs are skyrocketing, but agricultural prices are not compensating.
The numbers support his argument. "In the spring, at the height of the shock, non-road diesel prices jumped from about 700 euros to nearly 1,500 euros per 1,000 liters," details Arthur Portier. Fertilizer prices rose by nearly 20%, while wheat and corn only increased by 3 to 4%. Professionals speak of a destructive "scissors effect" for margins: on one side, expenses soar, while on the other, revenues stagnate or even decline.
Costs are skyrocketing, but agricultural prices are not compensating." Arthur Portier, farmer and consultant at Argus Media
The effect has even intensified since then. Far from compensating, agricultural prices have fallen: the FAO food price index decreased again in June (-0.3% month-on-month), dragged down by cereals (-3.5%), wheat (-4.4%), and corn (-6.2%), thanks to good harvest prospects. The scissors have not closed; they have widened.
In the short term, the 2026 harvest is not directly threatened, according to the Argus Media expert: winter crops have already been sown and fertilized. The danger lies later, at the autumn sowing. "If fertilizer prices remain sustainably high, some producers will reduce their acreage or change their crop rotations," he anticipates. Specifically, this will lead to cascading trade-offs: less acreage, fewer agronomic investments, abandonment of the most nitrogen-intensive crops, risking a decline in global production and increased social tensions.
Nitrogen fertilization is the most exposed, as natural gas accounts for nearly 80% of its production cost, and the urea market is hyper-concentrated around a handful of exporters: Russia (under sanctions), Qatar and Iran (dependent on Hormuz), China (which restricts its flows), and Egypt. And this is where an unexpected domino effect for Europe unfolds. "A quarter of our urea comes from Egypt. However, Egyptian factories operate on gas imported from the Middle East and Israel. As soon as a missile threatens a pipeline, production stops and prices soar," illustrates Arthur Portier, who draws a clear equation: "food sovereignty is intimately linked to energy sovereignty."
Reducing the crisis to a question of fertilizers would be a mistake. "Everything is connected," summarizes Charles Vaury, soil expert at Syngenta. Modern agriculture is a deeply fossil-fuel-based industry: oil and gas irrigate the entire value chain, from maritime transport to plant protection products, including plastic films, packaging, machinery, irrigation, greenhouse heating, and processing.
"The inflation of mineral raw materials mechanically leads to inflation across a whole chain of products and services intended for agriculture," emphasizes Nicolas Mousset. He warns: "This places us in a strategic dependence on a limited number of countries, from which we suffer international prices without being able to control them." Charles Vaury adds: "Today, it is with these mineral raw materials that an immense quantity of agricultural products is manufactured or transported."
"The inflation of mineral raw materials mechanically leads to inflation across a whole chain of products and services intended for agriculture" Nicolas Mousset
The example of crop protection products is enlightening. "The chemical intermediates found in a bottle of herbicide are cousins of those found in a bag of fertilizer: the same petroleum and gas derivatives, the same bottlenecks," deciphers Matt Crisp, agritech entrepreneur, co-founder of Quercus Biosolutions (bioherbicides designed by artificial intelligence) and former CEO of Benson Hill (crop genetic improvement, listed on the New York Stock Exchange, NYSE). Even when they do not pass through Hormuz, these products remain exposed to the same tensions.
This vulnerability is all the more strategic for Europe as it is accompanied by chemical deindustrialization. "A large part of synthetic plant protection products are now manufactured in Asia," observes Charles Vaury. "We have almost no European chemical industry capable of supplying European agriculture."
"We have almost no European chemical industry capable of supplying European agriculture." Charles Vaury
Hormuz cannot be analyzed in isolation; it is part of a succession of shocks that have gradually undermined the economic foundations of globalized agriculture. It is merely a revealer. With each crisis, the same vulnerabilities resurface: energy dependence, geographical concentration of resources, logistical vulnerability, decline of certain industrial capacities, low strategic autonomy. Even a sustainable reopening of the strait would not eliminate the underlying problem: an agricultural model that remains dependent on the fluidity of borders, abundant fossil resources, and suppliers concentrated in a few regions of the world.
This is indeed the turning point: the next decade will not be played out on a single shock, but on their repetition.
In the face of this forced transition, the very nature of agricultural innovation is pivoting. Long focused on the race for yields and competitiveness through volumes, it now places a new imperative at the center: agronomic and territorial resilience. "The challenge is to develop technologies in our territories that will reduce our dependence on imported inputs," argues Nicolas Mousset.
This transformation unfolds through several breakthroughs.
Producing nitrogen differently. To free itself from the Haber-Bosch process, which is highly dependent on natural gas, research is turning to fertilizers derived from low-carbon hydrogen and water electrolysis, as well as biological fixation solutions. "Above every hectare lies a vast reserve of atmospheric nitrogen; the challenge is to learn to mobilize it better," summarizes Nicolas Mousset.
Unlocking the potential of soils. Sovereignty is also played out beneath the farmers' feet: agronomic efficiency and soil microbiology. "More than 90% of the phosphorus present in soils is currently blocked and inaccessible to plants," reminds Charles Vaury. Stimulating microbial life to release some of these reserves can help reduce reliance on imported mineral phosphates. "A living soil is also a true resilience against climate shocks," emphasizes the Syngenta expert. A study by Soil Capital published in June confirms this: on more than 1,200 French farms, the most regenerative plots lost only 8% of yield in the event of drought, compared to 22% for the least advanced ones.
Establishing agroecology as an economic shield. Long confined to an environmental role, agroecology is also emerging as a strategy for economic security. Diversifying crop rotations, better mobilizing soil resources, reducing dependence on inputs or improving their efficiency: these practices are becoming risk management tools in the face of market volatility and supply disruptions. Reducing dependence does not necessarily mean eliminating inputs, but rather seeking to get more from each unit used. "I don't apply fertilizer for my own pleasure. If I could do without it, I would," summarizes Arthur Portier.
Modernizing rather than replacing. In the face of skyrocketing machinery costs, retrofitting—modernizing existing tractors rather than buying new equipment with equivalent power—can cost up to ten times less.
Decarbonizing machinery. Fossil dependence does not stop at fertilizers; machinery constitutes another front. Electrification when technically feasible, modernization of existing equipment, alternative fuels, or new engines all contribute to the same search for reduced exposure to oil. "There should be, calls for Nicolas Mousset, a real investment plan for the electrification of mechanical means, including tractors, regardless of the source: nuclear, hydroelectric, solar, or wind."
Bringing viable alternatives to the fore. Gaining autonomy also requires "developing technological means in our territories to find alternative solutions that are regulatory acceptable and, above all, economically viable," argues Nicolas Mousset. But their technical effectiveness is not enough: they must also be deployable at an economically sustainable scale. "This requires that our farm sizes be on average much larger to amortize these investments or technology purchases," he suggests.
Loosening the grip is not solely a matter of technological innovation. Diversifying suppliers, rebuilding certain industrial capacities in European territories, or establishing strategic reserves of critical resources are also part of the equation. According to the founder of Alpha Agriculture Technologies, "there would be every interest in building strategic stocks of critical resources, so as not to suffer the next crisis head-on." Sovereignty implies both reducing needs and securing what will remain necessary.
The Hormuz shock, whether it resolves in the coming weeks or not, will remain a wake-up call, neither the first nor the last. Geopolitical and energy crises are no longer mere accidents: they have become the climate in which agriculture must produce.
"There would be every interest in building strategic stocks of critical resources, so as not to suffer the next crisis head-on" Nicolas Mousset
In a world where energy, minerals, and maritime routes assert themselves as instruments of power, the independence of our food systems changes status. The innovation of the next decade will no longer seek merely to produce more: it will be the guarantor of our economic, energy, and vital sovereignty, so that agriculture is not condemned to suffer. Reducing imported inputs, better mobilizing available resources, diversifying supplies, and rebuilding certain industrial capacities are no longer just matters of competitiveness or the environment. They are now issues of sovereignty.
"Long-term solutions will also come from the private sector, because companies are directly involved in the sustainability of their economic model. However, the regulatory and economic framework must allow innovation to unfold," concludes Nicolas Mousset.
The next crisis will reveal less whether this diagnosis was correct than how far agriculture has managed, in the meantime, to reduce its exposure.
